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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
gent use, whether he is absent or present, it follows that ownership
rather than control, actual or presumed, should be the criterion for
determining the rights and liabilities arising from collisions. By
amending the Vehicle and Traffic Law so that the negligence of the
driver will be imputed to the owner in all cases where the vehicle is
used with his consent, express or implied, the legislature may achieve
a result that is uniformly just. In addition to putting an end to the
anomalous situation which has resulted from the interpretation of
Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law in Mills v. Gabriel such
an amendment would substitute sound public policy for the fiction
that the owner's presence in a vehicle gives him control over the
driver.
ANDREW J. GRAHAM.
POWER TO REMOVE AcCRUED CUGIMULATIVE DIVIDENDs-BUSINESS
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS THE LAW
"A cumulative dividend is one 'With regard to which it is agreed
that if at any time it is not paid in full the difference shall be added
to the following payment'.' * * * The idea being that arrearages of
one year are payable out of surplus earnings in subsequent years." 2
Except as provided for by the contract in the charter all stockholders
have fundamentally the same rights.8 Therefore, a conservative pur-
chaser of stock, who may not wish to take the common risk that a
corporation will earn a profit every year or if earned that it will be
distributed, buys preferred stock providing for cumulative dividends.
"Before paying dividends to the common stockholders, the stated
dividend with all arrearages, if any, must first be paid to these pre-
ferred stockholders. As against the common stockholders, the right
to this cumulative preferred dividend is fixed and vested though
payment thereof has been postponed. 4 When under the charter divi-
dends which are cumulative are not paid, such dividends are said to
be accrued cumulative dividends. In New York State it is well
which is in fact, if not in law, a provision for "compulsory insurance" for
automobiles, makes it clear that the policy of New York is to place the risk
of automobile operation squarely upon the owner rather than upon the public.
I CENT. DIcT.2 Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co., 210 App. Div. 141, 205 N. Y. Supp.
511 (4th Dep't 1924).
3 Lloyd v. Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 263, 72 At. 16
(1909) ("It has been held, and may be regarded as entirely settled, that calling
stock 'preferred stock' does not of itself determine the rights of the holders,
for the extent of the preference is to be determined by the terms of the con-
tract!').4 PRASH MR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1937) 772; Pennington v. Commonwealth Hotel Const. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 394,
400, 155, At. 514, 517 (1931).
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established that the right to the payment of such accrued dividends,
before dividends can be paid on the common stock, is a vested right.
Stockholders find, however, that the position of one entitled to
accrued cumulative dividends is not always an enviable one, and one
simple to protect. The problem of satisfying this accrued debt is
often a sore spot in corporate finance. There are many situations
wherein the nature of the right and the protections afforded it are
challenged at every turn. To say that the Constitution protects
vested property and contract rights and that the rights of stockholders
to accrued cumulative dividends are therefore within its protection is
a matter of over-simplification.
If the corporation earns a profit almost every year and accumu-
lates a surplus there is of course no problem. However, if the con-
tingency against which the stockholder sought assurance occurs, and
a long series of lean years results in huge accruals, the corporation
very often finds it necessary to reorganize and obtain fresh capital to
carry on. The usual method would be to sell stock, but further
investment in such a corporation is discouraged. No one wishes to
buy stock in a corporation heavily burdened by accrued dividends.
The incentive to buy, i.e., the expectation of receiving dividends, is
gone for the new stockholders will not be entitled to any dividends
until the accrued cumulative dividends are first taken care of. An
impasse seems to result for without fresh capital a corporation cannot
hope to earn a profit to pay off accrued dividends and it is impossible
to obtain the fresh capital until the accrued dividends are paid off.
Preferential stockholders are usually in the minority and the conflict
with the majority is inevitable. Business expediency favored by the
majority calls for the removal of the accrued dividends even if can-
cellation is necessary. The majority claims that obstreperous stock-
holders should not be allowed to hold up progress. On the other
hand, the minority demands constitutional protection for their contract
and vested rights. They claim the corporation must be conducted
legally; it may not be operated for the good of the majority stock-
holders only; it must be operated for the good of all of its stockhold-
ers-the minority cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of the majority.
New York State has firmly upheld the legal view of the minority
stockholders, 6 though the majority business view is not devoid of all
5 Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906);
Wiederson v. Atlantic Cement Products, Inc., 261 App. Div. 305, 25 N. Y. S.(2d) 496 (2d Dep't 1941) ("Cumulative dividends, which have accrued through
lapse of time on preferred stock, become vested contractual rights which cannot,
without the consent of the stockholder, be destroyed by the reclassification of
the capital stock of the corporation, pursuant to section 36 of the Stock Corpo-
ration Law"); Davison and Thompson v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc.,
et al., 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941).
6 See footnote 5, supra ("Balanced against the desire to encourage invest-
ment, however, is the sanctity of the rights of contract. The individual pre-
ferred stock investor has bargained for certainty in his return and may not be
deprived of his bargain without statutory authority." Davison and Thompson
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merit. However, in the case we are considering, the majority is in
the position of a party to a contract which makes no provision for a
contingency that has taken place. Though they may have driven a
bad bargain with the preferred stockholders they are bound by the
contract.7 This contract problem, in other particulars, has arisen in
the past to hamstring corporate finance. How the issue was4 met in
the past may well point to the solution of the present problem.
Business necessity always called for numerous and swift organ-
izational changes and therefore the contract between the shareholders
had to be made flexible. The legislature, recognizing the perplexity
of the question, determined to solve it by action under its reserved
powers to alter, amend or repeal corporate charters.8 Such action
within constitutional limitations 9 proved desirable to solve such prob-
lems. The procedure is as follows: By the authority of its reserved
powers the legislature passes a statute operating prospectively, giving
a certain portion of the shareholders the power to make certain
changes in the contract. When one becomes a shareholder with such
a statute, in effect he is deemed to have consented to the contract as
the law affects it. Since every such statute is as a matter of law read
into the charter a change initiated in accordance with the law is merely
the contract being executed as contemplated. If the shareholder
agreed to the procedure he is not being wronged by it. Exemplifying
such statutes as above referred to we have New York Stock Corpora-
tion Laws, Sections 35, 36, 37 and 38.10 By virtue of these laws a
v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc., et al., 185 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. [2d] 618[1941]).
7 Pearsall i. Great Northern Ry., 161 U. S. 646, 660, 16 Sup. Ct. 705(1896); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518, 4 L. ed.
629 (U. S. 1819) (Under the doctrine there "firmly established as a canon of
American jurisprudence, the charter of a corporation is deemed a contract") ;
Breslau v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div.
181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, aff'd, 273 N. Y. (memo) 141, 7 N. E. (2d) 708
(1937).8 N. Y. CoxsT. art. VIII, § 1, provides: "Corporations may be formed
under general laws; * * *, All General laws and special acts pursuant to this
section may be altered from time to time or repealed."; N. Y. GNx'mu.L CoaRpo-
,A0rioN LAW § 5, "The charter of every corporation shall be subject to altera-
tion, suspension and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature."
9 Long Island R. R. v. Department of Labor, 138 Misc. 612, 247 N. Y.
Supp. 278 (1931), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 498, 177 N. E. 17 (1931) ("One limitation
well settled is that the property of the corporation which has been acquired by
it cannot be taken away by the repeal of a charter. Mayor, etc. of New York
v. Twenty-third Street Ry. Co., 113 N. Y. 311, 21 N. E. 60 (1889). There is
no right to change the fundamental character of the corporation. Buffalo &
N. Y. City Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336, 338 41856). * * *
"And alteration and amendment must be reasonable. Shields v. Ohio,
95 U. S. 319, 324, 24 L. ed. 357 (1877)").10 N. Y. STocK CORPORATION LAW § 35: Changes of purposes, powers or
provisions, or nmber of directors or location of office. A stock corporation
may effect one or more of the following changes:
(A) To extend, limit, or otherwise change its purpose and powers
or other provisions of its certificate of incorporation.
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major portion of the stockholders-majority or two-thirds as the law
provides in given cases-is enabled to change the purposes and pow-
ers of the corporation; the number of directors; or the location of the
office. Likewise, changes in respect to shares, capital stock, or capi-
tal is authorized. Of course, all this can be done under the statute
and charter despite minority objection.
(B) To increase or reduce the number of directors, or to provide
that the number of directors, shall not be less than a stated minimum nor
more than a stated maximum; but in neither case below the minimum
number prescribed by law;
(C) To change the location of its office, if it is not a moneyed
corporation: By filing a certificate * * *. (In some instances a majority
vote is needed, in others a two-thirds vote is needed for a valid cer-
tificate.)
N. Y. STocK CORPORATION LAW § 36: Changes in respect to shares, capital
stock or capital. A stock corporation may effect one or more of the following
purposes:
(A) To increase or reduce the amount of its capital stock where all
of the capital stock is divided into shares having a par value;
(B) To increase or reduce the par value of any of its shares that
have a par value;
(C) To provide for the authorization of new shares of any class,
with or without par value, and to eliminate any previously authorized
shares;
(D) To change all or any of its previously authorized shares with
or without par value, issued or unissued, into the same or a different
number of shares f any class or classes either with or without par value,
or into the same or a different number of both shares with par value and
shares without par value, of any classes;
(E) To classify or reclassify any shares, either with or without par
value; and to authorize the issuance from time to time in one or more
series of the shares of any class of stock which is preferred as to
dividends or assets; subject to the limitation prescribed in section
eleven; * * *
N. Y. STocK ComRORATION LAW § 37: Subscription and authentication of
certificate.
N. Y. STocx CORPoRATION LAW § 38: Provisions applicable to one or more
proceedings under section thirty-six. * * * the following provisions shall be
applicable to a certificate under section thirty-six. * * *
8. The liability of the corporation, its officers, directors, and stock-
holders for corporate debts contracted or obligations incurred prior to
the filing of such certificate, shall be unaffected thereby, but for the
purpose of enforcing and recovering upon any claim a creditor shall have
the same right of recourse against the corporation, its officers, directors
and stockholders that he would have had if such certificate had not
been filed.
9. If the certificate alters the preferential rights of any outstanding
shares, any holder of such shares not voting in favor of such alteration
may at any time prior to the vote authorizing such alteration-* * *-
object to such alteration and demand payment for his stock, and there-
upon such stockholder or the corporation sliall have the right, subject to
the conditions and provisions of section twenty-one, to have such stock
appraised and paid for as provided in said section. * * *
1942 ]
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The questions that we must answer here are threefold:
1. Does any statute presently in effect authorize the removal of
accrued cumulative dividends without payment, by the direct action-
of a major portion of the stockholders over minority objection?
2. If no such statute exists, has the legislature the constitutional
authority to pass such an act under its reserved powers?
3. As the law stands today, what is the best practical solution
to the problem other than legislation?
I
In answer to the first question, an examination of the statutes
shows that Section 3611 of the New York Stock Corporation Law is
the only section necessary to be analyzed. It is the only law dealing
with the revision of the corporate charter in respect to stock and
stockholder's preferences. Although the statute clearly provides for
the reclassification of stock, prospectively, subject to the right of
appraisal,' 2 it does not expressly or by implication authorize the
cancellation of a non-assenting stockholder's right to unpaid dividends
which have accrued through lapse of time.13 Section 36 makes no
mention of accrued cumulative dividends. The statute is comprehen-
sive in scope, and failure expressly to provide for such a situation
indicates that no such authority was granted or contemplated by the
legislature.' 4  Any generalization is made more untenable when we
consider that the legislature expressly provided under Section 38,
subdivision 8, for the survival of corporate debts and contract obliga-
tions incurred prior to any reclassification under Section 36.' It
seems that this section should apply in respect to the debt accrued
under the contract obligation calling for payment of accrued cumula-
tive dividends.' 6 It is useless further to consider the problem as one
of statutory interpretation and construction. The New York courts
"1 See note 10, supra.
12 Davison and Thompson v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc., et al., 285
N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941) ("On the other hand, there can be no
doubt that sections 36, 37, and 38 of the Stock Corporation Law contemplate
the alteration of certain preferential rights of stockholders under these con-
tracts subject only to the dissenting stockholder's right of appraisal. Matter of
Silberkraus, 250 N. Y. 252; Matter of Kinney, 279 N. Y. 423").
i3 Roberts v. Roberts-Wickes Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. Y. 13 (1906);
Strout v. Cross, Austin & Ireland Lumber Co., 283 N. Y. 406, 28 N. E. (2d)
890 (1940) ; Wiederson v. Atlantic Cement Products, Inc., 261 App. Div. 305,
25 N. Y. S. (2d) 496 (2d Dep't 1941).
'14Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App.
Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, aff'd, 273 N. Y. (memo) 141, 7 N. E. (2d) 708
(1937).
25 See note 10, supra.
16 Wiederson v. Atlantic Cement Products, Inc., 261 App. Div. 305, 25
N. Y. S. (2d) 496 (2d Dep't 1941).
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find no authority for a solution of the problem under present statutes.
Stare decisis binds the courts 17 and we turn next to the possibility of
a change by the legislature.
II
Can the legislature authorize the removal of accrued cumulative
dividends? There is grave doubt whether such a power would be a
constitutional exercise of the legislature's authority to alter, amend or
repeal.' 8 The powers reserved by the legislature are subject to limi-
tations.' 9 Similarly limited are the rights given by the legislature to
a major portion of the stockholders to enact changes in the charter.20
The legislature cannot directly take vested property without due
process; 21 it cannot impair contract rights; 22 the legislature of course
cannot delegate more power than it has.
The above view is most certainly sound as to any retroactive
legislation of that nature. The property once vested cannot be con-
stitutionally divested. However, there might be a question of whether
or not a holder of stock calling for cumulative dividends, who became
such a holder with a statute in effect giving a major portion of the
stockholders the right to wipe out accrued dividends, would have a
vested property or merely a defeasible property in the accrued divi-
dends. If defeasible, the debt may be eliminated according to the
process provided for.23 However, since the legislature does not
attempt to delegate in any manner the power to remove accrued cumu-
lative dividends, we will simply leave the second question unanswered.
If such legislation is permissible, its advisability is another question
left unanswered. 24
17 See note 5, supra.
'
8 Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App.
Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, aff'd, 273 N. Y. (memo) 141, 7 N. E. (2d) 708
(1937). In that case the majority attempted by charter amendment to make
non-callable stock callable. The court held that Stock Corporation Law § 36
did not give the majority such pover and that the non-callable character of
the stock was a vested _property right. The court, moreover, said, "Again,
assuming the authority to make the proposed changes is implied in the statute,
we believe its exercise would contravene the provision of the Federal Constitu-
tion." Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 Atl. 115 (Del. 1936) (subsequent statute
unconstitutional if construed as authorizing removal of accrued dividends). But
see McQuillen, et al. v. Nat. Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 239 (1939).
19 See note 9, supra.2 0Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App.
Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, aff'd, 273 N. Y. (memo) 141, 7 N. E. (2d) 708
(1937).21 See note 20, supra.
2 Lord v. Equitabf" Life Assurance Soc., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443
(1909).23 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 Atl. 115 (Del. 1936) (such statute held
unconstitutional as construed) ; cf. McQuillen, et al. v. Nat. Cash Register Co.,
27 F. Supp. 639 (1939).24 Davison and Thompson v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc., et al., 285
1942 ]
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III
We come next to the third question. What can be done under
existing law? We can readily see from the answers to the first two
questions that those stockholders who are in favor of wiping out
accrued dividends, being faced with emphatic authority against direct
action, must solve the problem, if at all, indirectly. And so two
practical but indirect methods of nullifying the effect of accrued
cumulative dividends have been devised and both seem to have been
accepted in New York. The first method consists of inducing a
"voluntary" surrender of the accrued dividends. 25 The significant
feature is the use of "business" as distinguished from "legal" compul-
sion. The procedure in brief is as follows: The major portion of the
shareholders, desirous of doing away with the accrued dividend, enact
an amendment to the charter, under the authority of Section 36,26 by
which it is provided that the future rights and participations of the
old preferred stock exist no longer. As part of the same plan a new
class of stock with more advantageous rights is then issued. Provi-
sion is made whereby the old stock may be traded for the new stock
on the condition that a differential be paid which will be equivalent to
the amount of the accrued dividends. The problem for the minority
stockholder then becomes one of mathematics and business. Which
is worth more, the future benefits given by the new stock or the
accrued dividends to which he is entitled? The shareholder answers
this question for himself. He does not absolutely have to give up his
accrued dividends; he may keep them, although amendments in order
to accomplish the result intended make it so that it will usually prove
unprofitable not to exchange the stock.
Although accomplishing the result by devious means, there seems
to be nothing unconstitutional or impracticable about the method.
Prospective changes in stock preferences are lawful because of the
consent implied from the act of becoming a stockholder with statutes
in effect giving shareholders .the right to amend the charter in this
respect.27  Moreover, the method appears more fair in the light of
New York Stock Corporation Law, Section 38, subdivision 9,28
whereby the stockholder is entitled to an appraisal of his shares and
payment therefor by the corporation whenever the preferential rights
of his stock are changed and he does not consent to the change. This
N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941) ("Solution of the problem is further
complicated by the fact that any device the use of which is desirable in proper
cases for the elimination of burdensome preferential rights of preferred stock-
holders may be used in other cases, without regard to corporate needs and for
sole benefit of common stockholders").
25 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 122 Atl. 696 (Del. Ch. 1923).
26 See note 10, supra.
27 McQuillen, et al. v. Nat. Cash Register Co., et al., 27 F. Supp. 639, 645
(1939) ; see Blumenthal, et al. v. Di Groigio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 11.
85 P. (2d) 580 (1938).
28 See note 10, supra.
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provision for compensation takes the force out of any argument that
may be advanced on the theory that property is being taken without
due process of law. There is a recognized difference between the
compulsion of releasing dividends and making it so advantageous to
do so that the act becomes legally voluntary.2 9
The second indirect method of solving the problem consists pri-
marily of sidetracking the accrued dividends. If the dividend can be
made innocuous in so far as it will not hinder the raising of capital by
the sale of stock the main issue will have been met. The fact that
the dividend remains unpaid will then be the private concern of the
preferred shareholders. This result is accomplished when the share-
holders insert a prior issue of stock under the authority of Section
36.30 Dividends are made payable on this new issue whether the
accrued dividends are satisfied or not. Since the new dividends are
not conditioned upon the prior payment of accrued dividends, invest-
ment, by the purchase of the new stock, is no longer discouraged.
Moreover, the old first preferred stockholder is generally given the
right to exchange his old stock for the new stock on the condition that
he release his claim to accrued dividends. This last step makes the
practice somewhat similar to the first indirect method. The New
York courts have upheld the above practice.3 1
This 'second method seems subject to some collateral attack in
that the right to appraisal is denied to the stockholder whose accrued
dividends have been sidetracked. The theory is that appraisal is
allowed only when preferences are altered and in this case the nominal
prferences were left intact although a more preferred stock has been
superimposed.3 2 The New York Court of Appeals upheld the above
theory in the Duer case without an affirmative opinion, but the dissent
pointed out the formal construction given the appraisal statute 83 and
the utter disregard of substance and spirit. Except for this criti-
cism 34 the second method of solving the problem is proper and lawful.
Corporations have not always been successful in their efforts to
accomplish the result sought. An example of a failure is the case of
Strout v. Cross, Austin & Ireland Lumber Co.3 5 The corporation
attempted to satisfy an accrued cumulative dividend by payment of a
small portion thereof in cash and a major portion in fifty-year income
notes issued by its subsidiaries. A stockholder retained the cash but
2 9 Johnson, et al. v. Lamprecht, et al., 133 Ohio St. 567, 574, 15 N. E. (2d)
127, 130 (1938).30 See note 10, supra.
31 Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928); In re Duer,
270 N. Y. 343, 1 N. E. (2d) 457 (1936).
32 Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 161, N. E. 179 (1928). Contra:
Paterson, et ai. v. Durham Hosiery Mills, et al, 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906
(1939).
33 See note 10, supra, § 38, subd. 9.
34 Davison and Thompson v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc., et al., 285
N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618" (1941).
35 283 N. Y. 406, 28 N. E. (2d) 856 (1940).
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returned the notes, notifying the corporation that she had not con-
sented to receive income notes in payment of dividends. The court
held that the stockholder need not accept the dividend payment in that
manner on the theory that as the cumulative dividend accrued it was
in the nature of a general dividend. Once a general dividend is
declared or accumulated it is a debt payable by the corporation and
payable in cash. Whether an accumulated dividend is payable in
cash only is questionable."0 In any event it is dicta in this case for
even if the directors might in their discretion declare a property divi-
dend no stockholder could be forced to accept it.87
Conclusion
It is conclusively settled in New York State that accrued cumu-
lative dividends cannot be directly removed. This is the result of
proper statutory construction and interpretation. However, by other
powers which the legislature has reserved and delegated to a major
portion of the shareholders the result can nevertheless be reached in
many cases. It is always to be remembered that these indirect means
are legal, due to previous or subsequent consent given by the stock-
holder. Although in many cases it may seem improper to allow one
to do indirectly what he cannot do directly, it is not so in this instance.
The object to be achieved, i.e., the reorganization of the corporation
or the raising of capital, is proper and not against public policy. Of
course, if it should become necessary in order to achieve the object to
disregard the constitutional protections, the relative "good" in the
transaction would be far outshadowed by the "bad". A precedent for
taking property without due process should not be established no
matter how expedient. However, when as here, the end in view is
good there should be no restraint imposed if legal and proper means,
no matter how devious, can be found to achieve that end.
If direct action is desirable it is for the legislature to pass the
necessary laws. The dicta in the Breslav 88 case stating that a statute
of the necessary character would be unconstitutional is not entirely
sound. It is based on reasoning which begins with the conclusion
that the right to accrued dividends (or the immutability of non-
callable stock, there considered) is always a vested right without first
investigating the source of the vestedness, i.e., the contract. Such
rights are made vested by contract and there is no reason why the
contract cannot provide that they be defeasible. A statute expressly
allowing the removal of accrued cumulative dividends would change
3 6 Hastings v. International Paper Co., 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N. Y. Supp.
815 (1st Dep't 1919).
37 William v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 N. Y. 162, 193 (1883).
8 Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App.
Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, aff'd, 273 N. Y. (memo) 141, 7 N. E. (2d) 708
(1937).
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the nature of such right, in the hands of future stockholders, from a
vested property to a defeasible property. If corporate management
needs more freedom of action in this direction the remedy lies with
the legislature and not with the courts.
LEo SALON.
LIMITATION OF THE PROHIBITION OF A STATE TO TAX THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
The right of a sovereign state to tax its subjects is universally
recognized. This right of taxation, where it exists, is necessarily
unlimited in its nature and thus carries with it the inherent power to
embarrass and destroy.' Both the state government and the federal
government possess this right of taxation, but their reciprocal rights
and immunities are safeguarded by the observance of two limitations
upon their respective powers of taxation: (1) that the exactions of
the one must not discriminate against the means and instrumentalities
of the other, and (2) that they must not burden the operation of that
other.2 As early as 1819 it was settled that a state cannot exercise
this right of taxation in respect to any of the instrumentalities which
the federal government may create for the performance of its consti-
tutional functions.3
The immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation
may be waived,4 wholly or with such limitations and qualifications as
may be deemed proper by the law-making power of the nation, but
the waiver must be clear and unambiguous.5 An officer of the
2McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
2 Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct.
495 (1937).
3 MR. C~n i JusncE MARsHArm in McCulloclh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819) said, "The sovereignty of a state extends to every-
thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but
does it extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into
execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States?
We think not. Those powers are given by the people of the United States, to a
government whose laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to
be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single state cannot confer a sover-
eignty which will extend over them." See also Farmers and Mechanics Sav-
ings Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354 (1914) ;
People ex rel. Donne-Hanna Coke Corp. v. Burk, 217 N. Y. Supp. 803, 128
Misc. 195 (1926), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 507, 162 N. E. 503 (1928); Appeal of
Van Dyke, 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (1935).
4 "A waiver is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known
right," Lehigh Val. R. R. v. Ins. Co., 172 Fed. 364, 97 C. C. A. 62 (1909);
"or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right',
Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 1923) ; "or is inconsistent with claiming
it", Marfield v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 111 Ohio St. 139, 144 N. E.
689 (1924).5 Austin v. Aldermen, 74 U. S. 694 (7 Wall.), 19 L. ed. 224 (1868).
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